Details der Krise

Wer Genaueres über den Konflikt mit Nordkorea erfahren möchte, sollte ab und zu auf einen der amerikanischen Blogs von Marine-Insidern gehen. Gahlran bei Information-Dissemination hat eine interessante Analyse der maritimen Aspekte aus amerikanischer Perspektive, ein Auszug. Es geht um das sogenannte Playbook. Um das zu verstehen, sollte man allerdings alles lesen. Der Anfang sind die jährlichen Manöver:

Every year as winter ends in March, North Korea holds an annual military exercises as part of their spring training period that usually concludes with a big meeting with all the leaders in early April. This years meeting appears to have occurred on April 1st with the announcement that North Korea will restart their dead reactor. Despite news reports, I am skeptical that reactor will be back online this calendar year.

This annual training period in North Korea typically coincides with South Korea and the United States holding their annual Foal Eagle and Key Resolve exercises. For the past few years the pattern has been fairly consistent with North Korea being extra threatening (and feeling extra threatened) and usually a war of words breaks out for about a month or so. Once the US/South Korean military exercises end, North Korea will call for negotiations and take credit for resolving the crisis they manufactured in the first place. Last year when this chess game was over, many in the US had a bad taste in their mouth unhappy with the result, and as a result a lot of thought and planning by PACOM went into this years Foal Eagle 2013 exercises.

Nur diesmal ist es anders:

April Fools Day

If the US and North Korea have been playing a game of chicken as each side executed their scripted events in the public sphere, it is now clear that beginning on April Fools Day North Korea won that game of chicken, and the US was the first to flinch.

Every military activity related to the Korean peninsula discussed in the public was part of the script until on Tuesday – for the first time – the narrative being produced by US media was no longer fully incorporated into the Playbook. The retasking of USS Decatur (DDG 73) to head towards North Korea was a new event, and everyone who follows naval power closely knew it. The problem was, PACOM was one ballistic missile defense destroyer short of what was needed to meet demand signal coming from North Korean activities.

While most of the media made a big deal about the USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) being close to the Korean peninsula, the fact is the US Navy has a BMD capable destroyer on that patrol every single day of the year. Without going into too much detail, USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) is on a regular patrol that gives the United States an early warning detection capability should someone in Asia launch a ballistic missile at us. There is an AEGIS warship there 24/7/365 and on leap year day too. As soon as the media started talking about USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) and USS Decatur (DDG 73), neither of which has any attachment to Foal Eagle 2013 or the Playbook, apparently that is when the Obama administration got nervous and pulled back on the Playbook.

But here is the issue: PACOM needed USS Decatur (DDG 73) because there wasn’t another BMD ship available. Attention Congress, there is a capacity issue in 7th Fleet for BMD capable destroyers in the Obama administrations ‚pivot to Asia‘ plan, because the Navy fell short one forward deployed BMD capable warship when PACOM came calling in regards to a North Korean crisis.

 

 

 

Und eine Randgeschichte. Ein Nordkoreaner, galt wohl als Flüchtling, hat ein Schiff auf einer südkoreanischen Insel entwendet und ist damit über die Grenze nach Norden entkommen. Die Südkoreaner haben das zu spät bemerkt, die Joongangilbo hat dazu diese Grafik:
DSC03533
Und wer wissen will, wie oft schon Nordkoreaner in den letzten Jahrzehnten Schusswechsel zwischen Nord und Süd ausgelöst haben, hier ist die Liste.

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